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THE LI�ACRE QUARTERLY 
Book Review 
"?eueet411te1etat P.i,ei,,a� 
JOHN R. CAVANAGH, B.S., M.D., F.A.C.P., K.S.G. AND
JAMES B. McGoLDRICK, S.J., M.A., S.T.D., Ph.D. 
Review by William J. Devlin, S.J., A.B., M.A., Ph.L., 
M.S.S. W., Ph.D., M.D.
D R. CAVA.NAG�, a practicing psychiatrist, and Father McGoldric ,� Jesuit pn��t an� _Psychologist, have co-authored this te t_ ecause of _a �efimte and pressing need for an organize. :fpresentat10� of psychiatric studies 'which is duly based on the full ar. Iad�qua�e p'.cture of human nature." Their "point of view establish; l;
h
n mamt�med throughout this text is not the materialistic deification ( ;:
th: :::j 
it is not the N�o-platonic scorning of all matter; it is ratht ,;
f . f 
e course established long ago by the Aristotelico-Thomisti -us1on o matte d · · . 
· ·
1 d 
� an 
. 
spmt m man into one complete, bewilderinc.comp ex, ynam1c reality, the human person."
th 
The book is divided.into seven parts; an introductory chapter detail;e extent of ment�I disorders, describes and attempts a definition 0;: th.e tormal personality. Part ( 2) considers the psychogenic nature an J et10_ogy of _psychiatric disorders . Among the latter are intellectu 1�bits
.
' et�t1
d
o�al f�ctors, volition, heredity, occasions and conditionf·_ so me u e m this chapter is the authors' concept of . I scio b 
margma con -u:_nes�, as a su stitute for the repressed unconscious of Freud Th(·�syc
t 
i
(
a3tr
)
1c 
T
h
h
istory and mental examination make up the eleme�ts orar · ere follows one h t h . . · c ap er on t e psychoneuroses and thegeneral prmc1ples of their treatment· another on the h b I f t· J d . 
' psyc oses ot, u
h
nc i�na 
h
an orgamc; and a final one on the borderlands of psychiatry.w erem t e psychopath· J· · b 
ic persona ity, epilepsy, mental deficien d · t�r ances_ of sex and h_omosexuality are considered. Part ( 7) the ��nc/�: -s10n, depicts the relationship between psychiatry h·J h d 
. 
gio A t I I 
, p I osop y an reh-n. 
. 
we ve page g ossary containing explanations of 250 psy h. t . terms is appended to the text. The book is well written d d 
c Ia r
l
1c 
edited. an a equate y 
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In general, Fundamental Psychiatry has not achieved its basic 
purpose of an organized presentation of psychiatric studies based on the 
full and adequate picture of human nature as established by the Aristo­
telico-Thomistic fusion of matter and spirit in man into one complete, 
bewildering, complex, dynamic reality, the human person. Man is a 
unity, an unum per se, composed of matter and spirit, but primarily a 
unity, in essence, in nature, and in action. Psychiatry's fundamental 
interest is to understand and comprehend first man's unity in essence, 
nature and action, and secondly, the interaction of the various activated 
potentialities within that totality and unity. It is only by first under­
standing the unity of man in essence, nature and action that psychiatry 
will begin to comprehend this complete, complex, bewildering, dynamic 
reality known - as man. But this unity of man can never be perceived 
clearly or fundamentally from the viewpoint of man's efficient causality 
but only from the viewpoint of his final causality or teleological orienta­
tion. The "dynamic" part of man ultimately lies not in an efficient force 
but rather in a purposeful direction. This is the basic reason for the 
present popularity of psychoanalysis. It presents man as a simple unity: 
acting through the influence of the instincts, considered both as teleo­
logical directors and causal effectors of all activity in man. Dr. Franz 
Alexander, director of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, disclosed 
that it was psychoanalysis that brought teleology back to psychology. 
As Catholic philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists, we know that 
this psychoanalytic presentation is not enough but it does provide some 
sort of framework for the understanding of the basic personality of man, 
the genetic' development of this personality, and its present dynamic 
status. It is true that the scholastic system of philosophy and psychology 
has in its possession the true and only wholly satisfying dynamic presen­
tation of man, the unity in essence, nature and action, but this dynamic 
is only embryonically present in the scholastic system, and has never 
been worked through nor appeared in a book, neither in terms of its 
basic constituents nor in terms of man's development from the moment 
of conception until death. Only when we understand dynamically the 
"unity" can we ever hope to understand the interaction of the various 
elements of this unity. If we have no guiding "unity", we will have to 
resort to the questionable and time-consuming method suggested by the 
authors of analysing habits from a multiple point of view. 
With reference to specific topics treated in the text itself, the 
remarks that follow might take as their starting point the authors' dis­
cussion of the etiology of the neuroses. Perhaps nowhere else in the text 
do the authors approach more understandingly the emotional foundation 
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of mental disease than when they, in agreement with all psychiatris s, 
state the three pivotal points in the etiology of the neuroses: "1. t ,e 
earliest days, weeks, months, and years ( 1-6) of the child's life a ·e 
those in which the neuroses have their origin; 2. t�e pathologic ii 
psychic habits of children are usually the result of anxious attempts o 
defend the ego against the inroads of insecurity and deflation; 3. ad1 :t 
neurotic· symptoms take their tone, color, texture, and type from t. e 
early neurotic picture developed by the child." However, the autho s 
themselves support their theory of the unconscious in the sense f 
marginal awareness or .consciousness, as against the Freudian repressi .l 
unconscious, and add a fourth item: "Adult neuroses are built on tl � 
vague recollection of childhood traumatic experiences." It is extreme;, 
difficult to understand how an adult can vaguely recollect the traumat 
experiences of the first few weeks of life, because of which the chi! I 
established faulty reaction patterns. Moreover, when severely pressec . 
the authors push their unconscious so far out to the uttermost margin c: 
consciousness that one feels one has jumped over to the represse l 
unconscious of Freud. It is particularly disconcerting to us to read aboL · 
the 1·variant Catholic opinions on the unconscious. The only point c · 
agreement seems to be that unconscious acts of knowing are an ope. 
contradiction, and with this we would agree. But there are also sue 
things as early emotional experiences, directive of basic patterns o · 
perception and behavioral reaction which are quite apropos of the scho 
lastic system, and, at the same time, truly unconscious mechanisms; it i· 
timely for scholastic psychologists to get together, define an unconsciou, 
in the modern sense, and see where it fits into the scholastic system. 
In the light of the same three pivotal points it is impossible tc 
comprehend the authors' statement that all habits are initially free anc 
deliberate, and that the individual at first willingly accepts the wrons_ 
devices, (i. c. defense mechanisms) of thinking, emoting, and acting. Tc 
say, as the authors do, that all habits are formed only through intelligent 
repetition is to beg the question. To say that the essential element in 
habit formation is not in the mere mechanical repetition of the act but 
in the assimilation of a value is true; i. e. we repeat an action because it 
has some value to us. But the value can be other than religious, moral, 
or intellectual, especially in early childhood; and the value need not be 
known intellectually nor is it. Aside from these difficulties, to admit the 
authors' statement about habit formation is to uphold the moral theory 
of neurosis and psychosis; it would mean that every neurotic and 
psychotic individual is responsible and hence to be blamed for his 
mental status. 
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In the light of the same three pivotal points, it is also diff icu�t to 
comprehend why the authors state that emotions always contain a 
rational element. Both Dom Verner Moore and Rudolph Allers state 
that for an emotional experience one need not suppose any higher 
activity than the vis cogitativa of St. Thomas-and this is a sensory 
ability. Animals have emotions without a rational element; infants and 
young children have emotions without the proven presence of the 
rational component. It is precisely these very irrational elements that 
constitute the particular problem behind the faulty reaction patterns, 
that are the particular area of endeavor and labor for the psychiatrist. It 
is because of these irrational components, so strongly and deeply rooted 
in the mentally-ill neurotic and psychotic, that psychiatrists eschew, in 
great part, the intellectual approach in treatment upheld by the authors. 
Since the negative emotions have arisen early in a person's life, psycho­
therapy will be a long, drawn-out process if it is to achieve a basic 
reorientation and reorganization of the individual personality. It is true 
that in the case of a normal, mature, harmoniously developed individual, 
there is frequently found to be a rational component initiating his 
emotional experiences. That is why a normal mature person can be 
appealed to intellectually. can be stimulated by rational motives. On the 
other hand, common experience with neurotics and psychotics shows 
that this will not hold in their case. 
The authors have gone into great detail on the subject of defense 
mechanisms. Their approach to encouraging the patient to express 
feelings of hostility is particularly helpful in the treatment of the rigid, 
inhibited, scrupulous Catholic patient who· most frequently becomes 
laden with excessive guilt following even the weakest expression of 
hostile feelings, especially if the feelings center around those remote 
"remnants" of the experiencing man. 
The concluding chapter on the relationship between psychiatry, 
philosophy, and religion is handled well, but we must ever remember 
that the suffering neurotic and psychotic is to be treated much like the 
suffering pagan. Our missionaries feed the pagans first, take care of 
their illnesses, then tell them of God; so our neurotics and psychotics....:., 
they are in· dire need of kindness, understanding, acceptance, and 
patience which come from a human love in the first place, before they 
can rise to God their Maker and Greatest Benefactor. 
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